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Catalonia’s	referendum	on	independence:	Clarity	in
uncertainty
It	is	difficult	to	predict	how	events	in	Catalonia	will	play	out	following	the	planned	referendum	on
independence	on	1	October.	However,	as	Karlo	Basta	explains,	the	events	of	the	last	month	have
nevertheless	provided	some	answers	to	two	key	questions:	how	far	the	Catalan	government	was
willing	to	go	in	pursuit	of	independence,	and	how	far	the	Spanish	government	was	prepared	to	go	to
prevent	the	referendum	taking	place.	He	argues	that	with	positions	firming	on	both	sides,	the	best
hope	is	that	the	two	governments	can	show	the	leadership	required	to	prevent	any	further	escalation
in	tensions.
Over	the	past	three	weeks,	relations	between	the	Catalan	and	Spanish	governments	have	been	transformed
beyond	recognition.	On	6	and	7	September,	the	Catalan	parliament	passed	laws	paving	the	way	for	a	unilateral
referendum	on	the	region’s	independence,	scheduled	for	1	October.	In	response,	the	Spanish	and	Catalan
judiciary	and	security	services	enacted	a	series	of	actions	–	each	more	punitive	than	the	last	–	to	prevent	the
referendum	from	going	ahead.	Subsequent	days	saw	street	protests	and	a	sharp	escalation	in	rhetoric	on	all
sides.
As	is	typical	in	such	exceptional	circumstances,	time	has	sped	up.	The	sheer	volume	of	occurrences	and
information	has	become	difficult	to	process,	and	our	ability	to	reliably	estimate	future	developments	has	rapidly
diminished.	Yet,	despite	the	uncertainty,	recent	events	have	brought	clarity	on	at	least	two	long-standing
questions.
How	far	would	the	Catalan	government	go	in	pursuit	of	independence?
The	answer	to	this	question,	for	now	at	least,	is	much	farther	than	many	observers	would	have	assumed	on	the
basis	of	prior	experience.	The	developments	of	6	September	and	the	following	several	days	were	exceptional	in
two	ways.
First,	they	were	the	first	open	and	unambiguous	challenge	to	the	Spanish	constitutional	order	since	‘the	process’
(local	shorthand	for	the	pursuit	of	independence)	began	in	autumn	2012.	Most	prior	attempts	to	hold	the
referendum	were	either	conducted	in	conformity	with	the	prevailing	constitutional	order,	or	framed	in	such	a	way
as	to	avoid	legal	consequences.	Thus,	when	they	were	unable	to	mount	a	referendum	either	via	approval	of	the
Spanish	Congress	of	Deputies,	or	one	based	on	a	Catalan	law	on	referendums,	the	independentists	held	an
‘unofficial	citizen	consultation’	on	9	November,	2014.	The	subsequent	step	was	the	calling	of	a	plebiscitary
election	in	autumn	2015,	as	a	(legal)	substitute	for	a	referendum.	The	existing	challenge	is	a	decisive	departure
from	such	practice.
Second,	on	every	prior	occasion	the	Catalan	government	would	come	to	the	limit	of	constitutionally	allowable
action	but,	once	hit	by	contravening	court	orders,	would	draw	back.	This	started	to	change	in	2016,	when	the
Catalan	parliament	initiated	the	‘constitutive	process’	toward	unilateral	disconnection	from	Spain.	The	pro-
independence	parties	continued	to	pursue	their	course	even	when	resolutions	were	suspended	by	the
Constitutional	Court,	though	they	still	sought	legal	cover	under	the	existing	constitutional	order.	It	was	not	so	this
time	around.	Rather	than	retreat,	the	Catalan	executive	forged	ahead,	launching	the	referendum	campaign	in
open	defiance	of	suspensions	meted	out	by	the	Constitutional	Court.
The	old	temporising	and	ambiguous	patterns	of	political	activity	are	far	more	understandable	than	the	ones	we
are	seeing	now.	Neither	of	the	two	parties	in	the	governing	‘Together	for	Yes’	coalition	is	radical	(though	the
Popular	Unity	Candidacy	(CUP)	that	supports	it	is).	The	Democratic	Party	(PDeCat	–	formerly	Democratic
Convergence	of	Catalonia	(CDC))	has	traditionally	been	the	choice	of	Catalonia’s	upper	middle	classes	and	its
bourgeoisie.	As	one	of	the	pillars	of	a	coalition	government	between	2003	and	2010,	the	Republican	Left	(ERC)
tried	to	broaden	its	electoral	appeal	by	moderating	both	its	independentist	and	social	message.	These	are	not
normally	the	engines	of	revolutionary	change.
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Even	if	both	parties	have	changed	over	time,	they	remain	coalitional	in	the	sense	that	they	include	both
pragmatists	and	‘true	believers’	on	the	question	of	independence.	Ambiguity	is	what	helped	keep	them	together.
In	fact,	many	past	actions	in	the	direction	of	independence	satisfied	multiple	interests	at	the	same	time.	Consider
the	2014	demand	for	an	agreed	upon	referendum	referenced	above.	While	the	CDC	leadership	knew	perfectly
well	that	Madrid	would	not	budge,	the	move	provided	benefits	to	various	constituents	on	various	axes.	The	party
as	a	whole	got	to	bolster	its	independentist	credentials	relative	to	ERC.	Pragmatists	bought	time.	Committed
independentists	got	yet	another	bit	of	evidence	that	Spanish	elites	could	not	be	negotiated	with,	strengthening
their	position	for	the	future.
It	was	precisely	this	ambiguity,	and	the	lack	of	faith	in	the	commitment	of	nationalist	parties	to	their	cause,	that
prompted	many	independentist	Catalans	to	turn	to	extra-parliamentary	organisations.	The	most	significant	of
these	is	the	Catalan	National	Assembly	(ANC).	ANC	and	similar	organisations	were	instrumental	in	building	the
support	for	independence	over	the	past	seven	years.	In	that	context,	the	traditional	politics	of	postponement,
ambiguity,	and	reluctant	deference	to	existing	rules	was	a	risky	one.	The	developments	we	have	seen	in
September	suggest	this	approach	is	now	at	an	end,	but	much	will	depend	on	what	happens	over	the	coming	days
and	weeks.
What	would	the	Spanish	government	do	to	stop	the	referendum?
This,	too,	was	a	question	without	easy	answers.	The	only	certainty	was	the	Spanish	government’s	unconditional
and	unwavering	opposition	to	a	referendum	in	any	form.	How	that	opposition	would	be	actualised	was	not	known
until	now.
The	most	frequently	mentioned	option	was	the	application	of	Article	155	of	the	Spanish	Constitution.	The	article
allows	the	central	government	to	compel	any	regional	counterpart	that	is	no	longer	fulfilling	its	obligations	to	abide
by	the	constitution.	In	a	word,	it	permits	the	de	facto	suspension	of	regional	autonomy,	but	the	specific	legislative
and	regulatory	mechanisms	have	as	yet	not	been	developed.	The	alternative	was	the	more	generic,	but	easier	to
apply,	National	Security	Law	of	2015.	This	law	permits	the	government	to	more	rapidly	face	threats	to,	among
other	issues,	the	country’s	constitutional	order	(or,	to	use	the	original	wording,	constitutional	principles	and
values).
We	now	have	some	clarity	on	that	issue	as	well.	For	now	at	least,	neither	of	the	two	options	have	been	invoked.
Instead,	we	have	seen	a	slew	of	measures	devised	to	make	the	referendum	impossible.	Summing	up,	these
measures	have	had	the	goal	of:	sanctioning	the	officials	responsible	for	the	referendum	(both	political	and
administrative);	dismantling	the	infrastructure	necessary	for	the	vote	(closing	of	websites	and	confiscation	of
material);	and	precluding	the	financing	of	the	vote	(by	de	facto	suspending	the	fiscal	autonomy	of	the	Catalan
government).
Over	the	last	week,	police	reinforcements	have	been	sent	to	Catalonia	from	the	rest	of	Spain.	The	current
controversy	surrounds	the	order	to	seal	off	the	voting	stations	before	Sunday.	It	is	this	last	move	that	may	prove
the	most	contentious	and	possibly	dangerous	over	the	coming	days.
What	comes	next?
This	is	the	big	unknown.	Action	against	the	referendum	might	end	up	crippling	the	entire	effort.	In	that	case,	a
unilateral	declaration	of	independence	may	not	follow,	with	PDeCat	officials	already	on	record	in	opposing	it
(recall	PDeCat’s	reputation	for	ambiguity	and	temporisation	discussed	above).
Under	this	scenario,	demonstrations	would	likely	continue	for	some	time,	but	demonstrations	alone	would	not
impose	costs	serious	enough	to	move	the	Spanish	government.	This,	at	least,	is	the	read	of	the	CUP,	given	that
the	party	has	already	called	for	a	general	strike	as	the	next	stage	of	the	struggle.	Yet,	in	this,	they	may	not	find
many	allies.	Catalonia’s	two	largest	unions	are	not	on	board,	and	it	is	highly	unlikely	PDeCat	or	ERC	would	be
either,	though	the	Catalan	vice-president	Oriol	Junqueras	(ERC)	has	broached	the	issue	recently.
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All	this	may	be	moot	in	case	major	unrest	erupts	over	the	coming	days.	Even	if	it	does	not,	and	if	the	predictions
outlined	here	do	come	through,	the	short-term	outcome	will	be	a	seething	Catalonia	(or	at	least	one	half	of	it)
facing	off	against	an	unyielding	Spanish	government.	The	only	theoretical	way	out	of	that	impasse	remains
constitutional	reform	that	would	significantly	improve	Catalonia’s	status	and	competencies.	Indeed,	such	a	reform
would	likely	have	to	go	beyond	the	framework	of	the	2006	Statute	of	Autonomy	and	be	closer	to	the	2005
document	produced	by	the	Catalan	parliament.
Yet,	the	main	actors	needed	for	this	to	happen	have	dug	themselves	into	mutually	exclusive	narratives,	narratives
that	have	only	hardened	with	recent	developments.	For	the	Catalan	government,	the	currently	acceptable
minimum	is	a	referendum	agreed	on	by	the	Spanish	government.	It	is	a	minimum	that	is	well	above	the	maximum
the	executive	of	Mariano	Rajoy	is	willing	to	accept	right	now	–	a	mere	start	of	negotiations	over	constitutional
reform	with	unspecified	content.	Here’s	hoping	that	these	lines	come	closer	rather	than	further	apart	in	the
coming	days.	‘Blinking	first’	under	these	conditions	is	not	a	sign	of	weakness,	it’s	a	sign	of	leadership.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	Ramon	de	cal	Benido	(CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)
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